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Recently, physical objects other than computers are being identiﬁed in the Internet
using RFID technology. The information emanating from an RFID tag can be used to
identify and authenticate information about a physical object, but such information
also can be useful input to related information resources. The term “Internet of Things”
(IoT) has emerged to describe the interoperability between information associated
with physical objects and other information systems.

RFIDs, Near-Field Communications, and Mobile Payments

RFID has emerged as something truly new that implicates many of our long-standing
concerns and adds new ones to the mix-privacy, contracting, data security, international
differences, government-driven development, regulation, and legislative policy-setting
are all critical to discuss when it comes to this technology, plus we need to delineate
how lawyers might understand and explain the technology and its applications to
others. This book makes enormous strides in all those directions.
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An Economic Survey Analysis of
the Legal Literature Pertaining to
the Privacy Implications of Radio
Frequency Identification Technology
Mike Jerbic*

I. Introduction
Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology is general technology
increasing in use globally for the identification and tracking of people,
animals, and things. Over the past decade, legal scholars and practitioners
have published a substantial body of literature that discusses how use of
the technology could threaten individual consumer privacy interests. In
response to this literature and other events, former California Governor
*Mike Jerbic, an electrical engineer, economist, and a long-time member of the Cyberspace
Law Committee, is principal consultant at Trusted Systems Consulting Group, a lecturer in
Economics at San Jose State University, and a member of the Board of Directors of Cali
fornia Hydronics Corporation. Professor Jerbic is a past chair of The Open Group Security
Forum and formerly worked at Hewlett Packard. His other publications include Mike Jerbic
and Stephen S. Wu, The Security Rule, in A GUIDE TO HIPAA SECURITY AND THE LAW (ABA,
2007); Mike Jerbic et al., Information Security Strategy: A Framework for Information-Centric
Governance (The Open Group Security Forum, 2007), www.opengroup.org (document W075);
and Mattias Hallendorff and Mike Jerbic, Framework for Control over Electronic Chattel
Paper— Compliance with UCC §9-105, 61 BUS. LAW. 721 (Feb. 2006).
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Arnold Schwarzenegger signed Senate Bill 31 on September 30, 2008.1 This
law outlaws the skimming of personal information from RFID tags embed
ded in identity documents, such as passports, without the data subject’s
knowledge or consent. It provides for imprisonment for up to one year, a
fine of not more than $1,500, or both.2
Although the legal literature focuses on privacy rights and law theory,
intellectual property theory, and other matters related to law, it occasion
ally also analyzes involved actors’ economic interests to justify government
intervention (or nonintervention) in the use of RFID technology. This
essay surveys the legal literature from about 2004 through 2008 and looks
at the economic arguments made and risks identified in various legislative
proposals and recommendations related to the private sector use of RFID
technology. The essay concentrates its analysis in these dimensions:
r Market (private) interests, power, and failure
r Privacy risk analysis broken down into expected value of loss and
possible or speculative value of loss
r Alternatives to state coercion in managing privacy concerns: private
sector norms, architectures, and markets
r Suggestions for future work that provides the highest return for a
marginal research investment
This essay is written for those who have an interest in affecting public pol
icy around this issue. Although the policy-making process may not require
economic analysis, legislators and advocates of any position would improve
their argumentative position through consideration of the economic impli
cations of their proposals and positions. Incentives matter and modifying
the law changes incentives for all affected parties.

II. How the Economics of Private Information are
Different from Ideas and Knowledge Generally
Thomas Jefferson commented on the possession and use of information:
1.
2.

S.B. 31, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
S.B. 31, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
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If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea,
which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to
himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the posses
sion of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it.
Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because
every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from
me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who
lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That
ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for
the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his
condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed
by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space,
without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in which
we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confine
ment or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature,
be a subject of property.3
Economists describe information of all kinds such as ideas, knowledge,
and records, as nonrival, nonexcludable goods which, after initial produc
tion, maximizes social welfare when used and reused as much as possible
to produce marketable goods and services. Economists model information
production as having a fixed cost to produce but no additional, incremental
costs on each subsequent reuse. Guided by Adam Smith’s “invisible hand,”4
profit seekers aggregating, transforming, and repurposing information for
private gain not only make themselves better off, but make all of us better
off as well.
Reusing, aggregating, transforming, and repurposing personal and
“private” information, however, can place costs upon the subject of that
3.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS
THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 333-35 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905),
available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html.
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, at 363-64
(1776), available at http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/adam-smith/Wealth-Nations.
pdf.
OF

4.
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information who subsequently may bear embarrassment, loss of reputa
tion, intrusion into his or her personal space, criminal misuse, and other
consequences. Incrementally using private information without internaliz
ing these costs incentivizes profit seekers to overuse and over-reuse private
information for private gain at the expense of an overall reduction in total
welfare. This is the economic problem, or market failure, that government
intervention through privacy policy, law, and regulation tries to solve. The
severity of the real empirical problem and the effectiveness of the solutions
to that problem are other matters. Regulatory solutions are tradeoffs that
not only have the anticipated benefits, but costs as well.

III. How Contactless Data Exchange May Affect
Privacy Differently than Other Identification
Technologies
Regulating the use of private information is common around the globe. What
makes contactless data exchange something new to regulate or otherwise
control? What is specific to this technology that worries privacy advocates
and policymakers over and above other forms of collecting sensitive private
information? Briefly, contactless data exchange technology as expressed
through the example of radio frequency identification (RFID) has these
features and consequences not previously seen.

A. The kind of data available.
RFID tags can contain anything. When embedded in an ID card, they can
contain any manner of personal information. When attached to a product,
they can identify product manufacturer, product number, and serial number
for an unlimited number of products. In other words, RFID tags have the
potential to uniquely identify every person and thing on the Earth. In the
supply chain, they have been called “barcodes on steroids.”5
5.

The Honorable Patrick Leahy, United States Senate, The Dawn of Micro Monitoring:
Its Promise, and its Challenges to Privacy and Security, Address Before the Conference
on Video Surveillance: Legal And Technological Challenges, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.
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B. Data collection at a distance and without consent of the
consumer.
RFID tags contain information that a radio transmitter/receiver “reader”
can read and harvest at a distance ranging from a few inches to about 30
feet, without the knowledge or consent of the data subject. Using radio,
the “reader” does not even need a line of sight to read the “tag.” Deriving
their power from the radio frequency transmissions from the reader, highvolume, low-cost RFID tags also operate free from local power sources.
Without emitting any constant signal, which might alert the consumer, and
without any power source to wear out, these tags can operate indefinitely
and without any consumer awareness.
Although RFID tags considered in this analysis are the inexpensive “read
only” and “passive” variety, they can contain a block of any information the
tag producer wishes to encode. This might include personally identifiable
individual, access, and authorization information for ID card use; product
identification information for anticounterfeiting; inventory tracking that
management integrated into products or their packaging; and health record
information encoded into chips implanted into patients. The tag’s producer
knows what’s on the tag. Consumers do not, making them unaware of what
information is being collected about them.
Because the tags can be small, about the size of a grain of rice, consum
ers may be ignorant of their presence and use in products. Clothing may
have an RFID tag nearly invisibly integrated into a label or piece of fabric,
for example. A consumer wearing a tagged article of clothing and carrying
an RFID identification card or passport could, after an initial scan with
both the clothing and passport, be later identified solely by identifying the
clothing article alone, raising an issue of whether scanning her clothing
violates her privacy rights.

(Mar. 23, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2004/s032304.html. Senator
Leahy appears to have coined the phrase “barcodes on steroids.”
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C. Data aggregation to build profiles.
Data collected from RFIDs can be aggregated to build consumer profiles,
again without the consumer’s knowledge. Privacy advocates worry that tags
identifying products can be read in conjunction with consumer ID informa
tion to build profiles of that consumer, which could reveal that Consumer
X buys brand Y, reads books Z, associates with other consumers A, B, and
C, etc. Profiles built would have a market value to both private and public
organizations.

D. Data repurposing, reuse, and resale
As data are aggregated and profiles built, even if consumers consent to an
initial use of information, data can be used for purposes not conceived at
the time of consent. In addition, profiles compiled from data collected may
be valuable for new purposes, and profile holders may sell profiles or other
aggregated information to willing buyers, including public-sector buyers.
Although data reuse and resale is nothing new, RFID technology may reduce
the cost of individual data collection and aggregation, and may improve the
specificity and quality of the data to the point where new privacy threats
emerge that previously were economically unfeasible.
“Contactless data exchange,” or “RFID,” is not one but a collection of
information devices that spans a spectrum of low-cost, low-function devices
to high-cost, high-function devices and systems. The low-cost, rice-size,
passive RFID chips represent the high-volume, low-cost part of the mar
ket. Beyond its uses for inventory management, this technology has been
integrated into credit and debit cards, employee identification cards, auto
mobile keys, and other applications where a low-cost, contactless electronic
identifier improves productivity, performance, and security.
At the high-cost, high-function end of the spectrum, services such as
GM’s OnStar—a tracking and emergency response system—and the FasTrak highway and bridge toll transponder also are within the scope of
“contactless data exchange technology.” All these technologies share the
potential that data may be collected without the data subject’s knowledge
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or permission, aggregated to build profiles, and subsequently repurposed,
reused, or resold.
Just as in any other differentiated-product market, competition in contactless information exchange markets likely will produce products at various
cost and value price points. Although the literature emphasized privacy
threats from the lowest-cost, highest-volume RFID tag technology, only
time will tell which technical price-information source may or may not turn
out to be the most privacy-relevant one.
As a new technology ripening for commercial and government use and
abuse, contactless data exchange appears to threaten individual privacy as
traditionally appreciated and expected. The question surveyed now, and the
subject for the rest of this essay, is “how has the literature assessed these
threats as a matter of economic theory and incentive?”

IV. Private Market Forces, Power, and Failure
Underlying any market force theory is the notion that property rights in
information are well defined and exchangeable. Lars Smith asks that very
question in his paper, RFID and Other Embedded Technologies: Who Owns
the Data?, and the answer is far from obvious.6 A consumer’s property rights
in information about himself or its aggregation are unclear. Does the origi
nator or collector of the information have ultimate control over who can
read it as copyright law might imply? Might the reader owner(s) “own” the
harvested data more than the entity that originally installed or placed the
RFID tag into the object? Does the possessor of the device on which the
information is stored own it as tangible property law might imply? Some
how is it a combination of both? Neither? What law dominates? Market
exchanges of information rights leading to privacy rights depends on solv
ing this problem.
One thing is certain, however. A consumer’s right to control information
about himself is not absolute, but one that depends on the situation. No
one has a right to privacy to control incriminating evidence about himself
6.

Lars S. Smith, RFID and Other Embedded Technologies: Who Owns the Data?, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 695 (2006).
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when, for example, law enforcement has a warrant to search for that evi
dence. Consumers generally have no rights to keep their actions private when
conducted in a public place. Therefore, privacy is a question not of whether
there’s some protection, but how much and under what circumstances.
In spite of confusion over the definition and initial assignment of rights,
the surveyed literature separated into two general categories of its inter
pretation of markets and market forces: (1) free market forces dominate
and sustain efficient privacy, and (2) market failure forces dominate and
prevent efficient privacy.

A. Free market forces dominate and sustain privacy
Consumers negotiate preferred levels of privacy with business, achieving an
economically efficient and mutually agreeable level of well-being based on
market opportunity, incentives, and equilibriums. Commentators including
Brito7 and Ulatowski8 show how RFID applications can be created, tried
out, and, if found sufficiently objectionable to consumers, die out without
any government intervention.9 Using the Nike and iPod Sport Kit as an
example, Ulatowski discusses the commercial viability of a hypothetical
RFID reader network that scans information from iPod Sport Kit cus
tomers passing by the readers during their routine exercise and concludes:
Beyond simple hackers, this technology might be attractive to the
corporate world. In fact, it would be quite easy, and possibly quite
lucrative, “for a company to build their own tiny readers and deploy
them in a large environment, selling the data stream to those who
would track spouses or teens, or collect information about how many
people wearing Nikes visit malls or movie theaters.” Retailers are not
likely to employ this technology, however, because they have little
7.
8.

9.

Jerry Brito, Relax, Don’t Do It: Why RFID Privacy Concerns Are Exaggerated and Legis
lation Is Premature, 2004 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 5 (2004).
Laura M. Ulatowski, Privacy on the Internet and in Organizational Database: Recent Devel
opments in RFID Technology: Weighing Utility Against Potential Privacy Concerns, 3 ISJLP
623 (2008).
See Brito, supra note 7; Ulatowski, supra note 8.
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motivation to invade customers’ privacy. The public backlash would
probably be reason enough to dissuade retailers from employing such
technology.10
Proponents of the “free market forces dominate” theory suggest govern
ment regulatory restraint, and if any intervention is needed, government
should implement it only after the public need has been firmly established.
Brito, in particular, writes: “Before we regulate, we should first confirm
that privacy fears are not baseless and will not be constrained by market
forces. Additionally, we should be more concerned by government use of
RFID—something to which privacy advocates have paid little attention.”11

B. Market failure forces dominate and prevent privacy
This theory posits that some businesses will have sufficient market power
to coerce consumers into exchanging their personal information or allow
ing information to be collected about them involuntarily. Alternatively,
consumers unwilling to share their information will “be forced” to pay for
that choice through higher retail prices. This theory rests on an assumption
that major retailers have pricing power and will use it to gather, aggregate,
and exploit personal information for private business use at the expense of
the efficient public good privacy level. Eden12 and Stein13 share this general
view. Eden, in particular, writes:
There are two broad threats to privacy posed by this new technology.
First, under our current privacy regime private companies are at liberty
to gather, process, and share customer data without obtaining customer
consent to specific data aggregation, archival, and sharing policies and
procedures. This feature of our privacy regime is particularly vexing
10.
11.
12.
13.

Ulatowski, supra note 8, at 635.
Brito, supra note 7, at 5.
John M. Eden, When Big Brother Privatizes: Commercial Surveillance, the Privacy Act of
1974, and the Future of RFID, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 20 (2005).
Serena G. Stein, Where Will Consumers Find Privacy Protection from RFID?: A Case for
Federal Legislation, 2007 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3 (2007).
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given that we live in an era in which identity theft is particularly com
mon and extremely hard to prevent; thus control over private data
is extremely important. Second, the absence of meaningful regula
tion of new surveillance technologies, particularly RFID, is having
a profound effect on the broader social norms that privacy protects.
Private facts about consumer preference patterns are currently treated
as cost-free commodities for corporate America: companies need not
pay for the privilege of aggregating and using data, nor is consumer
consent regarded as necessary because consumer surveillance has
already been presented as a common practice that is usually in con
sumers’ best interests.14
In light of dominant market failures leading to inefficiently low public
privacy expectations, proponents of this theory advocate preemptive gov
ernment intervention to prevent privacy abuses and erosion of public
expectations.
Two groups emerge from this analysis. On the one hand, those who believe
that private markets will determine an efficient balance of the social good
of privacy, private economic growth, and welfare will have a hands-off,
wait-and-see approach to regulation or other governmental intervention.
On the other hand, those who foresee an as-yet-undemonstrated market
failure demand immediate preventive government intervention.

V. Privacy Risks: Probable Loss Versus
Possible Loss
RFID technology is new and its applications now and into the future are
uncertain. Originally intended as a tool to reduce private sector losses in
global supply chains and to improve security through “smart” identification
cards, RFID no doubt will find new, innovative uses that have unintended
consequences of both its planned and unplanned use. All new technologies
have this fate and RFID is no different.

14.

Eden, supra note 12 at 21.
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Although the privacy literature is clear that there is no absolute right to
privacy, an expectation of privacy is a social good that makes us all better
off. A measure of privacy protects civil society; a bit more protects indi
viduals from identity theft or misuse of information.
Government specifically protects the privacy of certain personal infor
mation such as health records through HIPAA15 and financial information
through the privacy provisions of the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.16
Expectations of privacy exist in attorney-client privilege, and privately con
tracted confidentiality clauses are enforceable to enable commerce. The
question is not whether we should have privacy, but rather how much and under
what circumstances. Risks to privacy, as measured by the expected value of
its loss, represent real social costs.
In analyzing privacy risks, the literature takes generally two approaches:
(1) a probable approach to the loss of privacy and (2) a speculative, worstcase scenario, possible-loss approach. Although the probable-value approach
is true risk management17 in the economic and classical sense, the other,
speculative approach is not. Policymakers reviewing the literature need to
determine which discussion of risk is used and use the literature accordingly.
This section describes the two approaches and gives an example to help out.

A. Probable privacy loss
Brito discusses likely RFID technology capability, especially at price lev
els that would enable pervasive use, concluding that in the private sector
retailers already track consumer purchases, with consent through loyalty
programs and otherwise, and attempts to track individuals’ movements
and locations through movement of their purchased goods is unreliable.18

15.
16.
17.

18.

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1339.
See Open Group Risk Taxonomy Standard, Open Group document C081, 18-19 available
at www.opengroup.org/bookstore/catalog/c081.htm (discussing the components of infor
mation risk).
See Brito, supra note 7 at 18, 21–23.
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Although the private sector possibly could invade consumer privacy with
RFID technology, Brito argues that the profit motive checks and incentives
make invasion unlikely.19 The probable privacy loss in his analysis is far less
than the possible loss discussed in other literature.
Ulatowski looks at privacy as a continuum, not as an absolute, and forms
estimates of privacy risks within a cost-benefit framework and an evalua
tion of the likely threats. Ulatowski concludes:
With RFID technology, “[t]he cost of the sacrifice of privacy is hard
to quantify while the touted benefits seem hard for many people to
overvalue.” Maybe the government and private industry are right to
tout the exceptional benefits to efficiency, privacy and security. Per
haps the threat to personal privacy is not as great as some privacy
advocates fear. The most significant limitation to RFIDs’ tracking
capabilities is that the power level of the chip must be quite low so as
not to interfere with other devices using radio frequency.
One real privacy threat comes not from RFID devices themselves,
but from hackers. In fact, hacking seems to be getting easier by the
day. Plus, mobile phone vendors are looking into developing portable
RFID readers coupled with cellular phones, making “RFID technol
ogy a user-driven activity in addition to one controlled by companies.”
If any teenage hacker with a cell phone can access personal informa
tion held on an RFID, it makes for quite an alarming proposition.20

B. Possible privacy loss
Eden, J. Smith, and Stein speculate on possible outcomes that are unproven
and ignore the likelihood or probability of the event.21 Eden’s abstract puts
it succinctly:
19.
20.
21.

See Brito, supra note 7 at 37.
Ulatowski, supra note 7 at 647–48 (footnotes omitted).
See Eden, supra note 12 at 11–14; Jennifer E. Smith, Recent Development: You Can Run,
but You Can’t Hide: Protecting Privacy from Radio Frequency Identification Technology, 8
N.C. J. L. & TECH. 249, 262-265 (2007); Stein, supra note 13 at 6–7.
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RFID is a powerful new technology that has the potential to allow
commercial retailers to undermine individual control over private
information. . . . Although some potential privacy abuses could be
addressed by modifying RFID technology, this iBrief argues that it
would be wise to amend the Privacy Act of 1974 so that corporations
would have a statutory obligation to preserve individual anonymity
and respect the privacy preferences of consumers.22
In addition, Stein concludes that “[i]n the absence of enforceable regula
tions, society risks being subjected to an unprecedented level of Orwellian
surveillance”23 and J. Smith foresees that “[w]ithout regulation, RFID will
be used to track both products and people.”24
Because they’re uncertain, technology’s capabilities are often exaggerated,
especially with respect to features not yet available at a mass consumption
prices—or expected to be available in those price ranges in the near future.
Speculative privacy loss not only depends on a general market failure theory,
where consumers involuntarily hand over access to personal information, but
also upon a widely deployed and available technical infrastructure to gather,
process, transform, and exploit that information. These assumptions of
market failure and an enabling and cost-effective ubiquitous infrastructure
are common to analyses recommending preemptive governmental interven
tion to prevent unspecified yet dire outcomes. Politicians have amplified this
approach: “[T]he RFID train is beginning to leave the station, and now is
the right time to begin a national discussion about where, if at all, any lines
will be drawn to protect privacy rights.”25
Policymakers motivated by the public interest should evaluate carefully
what social risks they are attempting to manage, the likelihood of the benefits

22.
23.
24.
25.

Eden, supra note 12 at 1.
Stein, supra note 13 at 3.
Smith, supra note 21 at 250.
Katherine Albrecht and Liz McIntyre, RFID: The Big Brother Bar Code, 6 ALEC POL’Y
FORUM 49 (Winter 2004) (quoting Senator Patrick Leahy at the panel discussion on Video
Surveillance: Legal and Technological Challenges at Georgetown University Law Center
(Mar. 23, 2004)), available at http://www.spychips.com/alec-big-brother-barcode-article.
html (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).

BL_CSTF_RFID_FINAL.indd 491

7/8/13 3:43 PM

492

RFIDs, Near-Field Communications, and Mobile Payments

exceeding the cost of managing those risks, and the residual risk remaining
in considering any law or regulation. When using the literature on RFID,
including the essays in this ABA collection, policymakers should internalize
the authors’ perspectives on privacy, distinguish between likely and specula
tive risks, and assess the cost effectiveness of any proposed rule, regulation,
or other policy intervention. In other words, the policymaker’s perspective
on privacy is key: is privacy an absolute, all-or-nothing proposition, or is
it a continuum to be traded off against other competing social objectives?

VI. Alternatives to Law and Regulation
Although the vast majority of the literature concentrates on RFID technol
ogy, the probable and possible outcomes of its use, and the recommendations
for its regulation, a minority strand presents alternatives to law and regula
tion to achieve the desired social outcome. In particular, Ronzani, citing the
work of Larry Lessig as a backdrop and Lessig’s four “modalities” of law,
social norms, markets, and technical architecture, stresses the need to look
beyond law to constrain behavior.26 Social norms include not only unwrit
ten rules within a community to govern or moderate behavior, but also
voluntarily agreed to and enforceable codes of practice and standards of
business conduct developed through private business associations. Markets,
as already discussed in the literature, moderate behavior through voluntary
exchange and prices, but the role of technical architecture—that is, techni
cal features that constrain behavior or capability such as privacy-enhancing
technology—is generally new to the discussion of RFID social policy. Ron
zani discusses the problem as:
The problem is that from a holistic perspective, we risk over-regulating
with law if we do not consider the trade-off between the four modali
ties. As noted earlier, the claim in this paper is that if norms, market
and architecture are considered, this will result in less need for laws.
26.

Daniel Ronzani, Modality Mix of RFID Regulation, 3 J. INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 222 (2008)
(referencing Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999)).
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This trade-off is possible and affordable because the technology-inde
pendent legislation enacted at [sic] European level is already sufficient
to protect the stakeholders (with some limitations).27
Today, changes in law are the dominant solutions to the privacy “problem,”
incrementally favoring either the consumer or business, but not both. In
the context of rapidly changing technology, law’s inflexibility has the side
effect of eliminating opportunity before it can ever have a chance of devel
oping. Mechanisms and tools outside of law give policymakers options that
are less politically polarizing and more flexible to adapt to changing views
of the privacy problem as it emerges, enabling innovation and economic
growth. The lowest-cost RFID technology, such as that designed for trac
ing things in the supply chain, much less the technology that tracks people
through identification and authorization cards, are both still too expensive
for ubiquitous deployment needed to create an “Orwellian” surveillance
society. Ronzani argues that markets, norms, and the architecture itself
will flexibly and affordably evolve to address privacy concerns while giving
the innovators a chance to use the technology to its highest social value.28

VII. Missing from the Literature: Economics of
Government’s Impact on Contactless Data
Exchange Technology and Privacy
As Brito points out: “We should be more concerned by government use of
RFID— something to which privacy advocates have paid little attention.”29
Although privacy advocates may have paid little attention to government
use, some conclusions nevertheless can be drawn from available information.
Governmental executive branches have many of the same functions and
incentives as the private industry. The same benefits that contactless data
exchange technology brings to the private sector also can improve operations

27.
28.
29.

Id. at 223.
Id. at 222–223 and 230–231.
See Brito, supra note 7 at 5.
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of the public sector,30 and in many cases, governmental organizations inno
vate and lead the private sector in adopting new technology. RFID began as
a government initiative. Both Axis and Allied forces are widely credited as
being the first to use RFID technology in an application to identify allied
aircraft during World War II.31 Today the U.S. government embeds RFID
chips into passports as well as RFID chips in its supply chains.32 Govern
ment has been and will continue to be a heavy user of this technology, just
like the private sector. The incentives and economics of that use should be
similar, too.
Being such large users and—in many cases—early adopters, governments
often develop or sponsor the initial technology and knowledge base. As
very large users of the technology for public purposes, governments develop
polices and standards for its use. For example, the U.S. government through
its National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has published
NIST SP-800–98 “Guidelines for Securing Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) Systems,” and this standard is available for public and private sec
tor use.33 Government, in functioning like an enterprise and research arm,
can help develop for itself the best practices in the use of the technology
that the rest of the world can reuse.
Just as its incentives for developing and using the technology are simi
lar to those motivating private sector actors, the government’s incentives
to collect, aggregate, repurpose, and reuse information are similar to the
private sector’s as well. When government does not internalize all costs,
including the social costs of privacy-eroding use, then the government’s
use is economically inefficient, reducing overall welfare, in the same man
ner as private sector overuse. The government, however, has powers and
privileges beyond those of the private sector, and when government stands
30.
31.
32.
33.

For additional discussion of this phenomenon, see Roland Trope’s essay “Maddening to
Militaries and Museums” in Chapter 17 of this book, infra.
RFID JOURNAL, The History of RFID Technology 1, available at http://www.rfidjournal.com/
article/articleview/1338/1/129/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).
For more discussion of this application, see chapters by Stephen Middlebrook and Roland
Trope, infra.
National Institute of Standards Technology, GUIDELINES FOR SECURING RADIO FREQUENCY
IDENTIFICATION (RFID) SYSTEMS (2007), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nist
pubs/800-98/SP800-98_RFID-2007.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
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sufficiently to benefit, history has shown it will use its powers and privileges.
The consequences of using those powers and privileges sometimes distort
incentives even further than the private sector can do on its own. Given how
little research has been conducted in the analysis of government use of contactless data exchange and RFID, this is an area ready for more research.

VIII. Conclusion and Next Steps
Like any change in law and regulation, RFID law and regulation will transfer
wealth, creating winners and losers. Although little in the literature quanti
fies the wealth at risk, policymakers, using economic theory, can anticipate
and predict general flows of wealth implied by proposals in the RFID law
literature, based on its assumptions about markets and the kind of risk
analysis and assessment made.
This survey of private-sector use of RFID and its resulting risks to pri
vacy expectations reveals that part of the literature foresees well-functioning
markets moderating private-sector privacy abuses, estimates privacy loss
based on a likely or probable loss scenario, and recommends a reactive legal
intervention policy to address actual discovered problems. Another part
of the literature foresees market failure, estimates speculative, worst-case
scenario privacy losses, and recommends a preemptive legal intervention
policy to prevent possible dire outcomes.
Privacy Loss Risk Approach
Probable

Market Belief

Market Forces
Dominate
Market Failure
Dominates

Possible

y
y

Market assumptions and the approach to risk management will determine
policy outcomes. Policymakers should consciously evaluate their economic
belief about the market and their approach toward risk management before
taking a position on RFID technology policy. Both under-regulating and
over-regulating have net social deadweight economic losses, including
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losses from economic opportunities preemptively and prematurely made
illegal. Economic analysis shows that use and reuse of information gener
ally improves total welfare, but external costs to the data subject can change
that general conclusion.
Policymakers concerned about privacy erosion arising from the private
sector use and overuse of new technology, including RFID, need a compre
hensive framework for analyzing this class of problem and the implications
of proposed solutions. This literature survey demonstrates that analyzing
market assumptions and approaches to risk management are necessary, but
they are hardly sufficient. The social costs and benefits of government’s use
of the technology is an opportunity for more research, and economic con
siderations that apply to policy generally but not specifically to contactless
data exchange have not been addressed here.
The next step in this analysis would be to derive a framework that includes
all other necessary and sufficient dimensions. Although such an undertaking
is ambitious, it could be accomplished through a collaborative, multidisci
plinary approach that includes legal, technical, and economic contributors.
Such a framework would look at the constraints and incentives imposed by
all modalities regulating actors’ behavior, their immediate and foreseeable
future consequences on wealth generation and distribution, and their exter
nal social side effects. The social impact of government’s use of both public
sector and private sector collected information could be analyzed, includ
ing the likelihood of policy effectiveness and lost opportunities of diverting
regulatory resources to this technology to other uses of those resources.
Whether regulating RFID use at all improves social welfare remains an
open question.
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